Proof of Conviction by Cross-Examination by Hinton, Edward W.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1927
Proof of Conviction by Cross-Examination
Edward W. Hinton
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward W. Hinton, "Proof of Conviction by Cross-Examination," 22 Illinois Law Review 189 (1927).
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
with reference to the default judgment seems to be contrary to that
of the North Carolina court in the case under review.
1
Whatever may be the state of the authorities, one may venture
to suggest that nothing has been discovered which has caused any
doubt of the feasibility of T's suing A and the undisclosed P in
the same suit. This can be permitted without adopting the theory
of Beymer v. Bonsall, supra. Up to this point the North Carolina
court seems to have a majority of the authorities in its favor. It
was a different and a further result when this court permitted two
judgments to be rendered.
KENNETH C. SEARS.
BEST EVIDENCE-PROOF OF CONVICTION BY CROSS-EXAMINA-
TION.-[Massachusetts] An interesting question under the "best
evidence" rule is presented by a recent Massachusetts case.' The
defendant was prosecuted under a statute increasing the penalty
where the accused had previously been convicted of the same of-
fense. The information charged a prior conviction, but the pros-
ecution did not introduce any record to sustain it. When the de-
fendant took the stand on his own behalf he was compelled to
admit on cross-examination that he had previously pleaded guilty
to a similar charge and paid a fine. The Supreme Court approved
the conviction carrying the increased penalty on the ground that
since the prior conviction could have been proved by the confession
or extra-judicial admission of the defendant, it was equally provable
by his admission on the witness stand, and that by taking the stand
he waived his privilege and subjected himself to cross-examination
on all elements of the offense.
There is suprisingly little authority on the point and ap-
parently none supporting the present holding.
41. Cross & Co. v. Mathews and Wallace (1904) 91 L. T. R. 500,
reached a result in accord with that in New Jersey. It should be noticed,
however, that it was a case of a disclosed rather than an undisclosed princi-
pal. Upon that theory, there was no cause of action, normally, against the
agent. Should the court, therefore, have disregarded the default judgment
against him as the basis of an election? Goodale v. Page (1912) 92 S. C.
413, has some dicta that may be interpreted as requiring an "election" before
suit is brought if T only desires to bring one suit.
In Phillips et al. v. Rooker et al. (1915) 134 Tenn. 457, a judgment
against agents of a disclosed P by confession was held to be an election
which would prevent "a further and final decree" against the principal.
However, the court imputed to T that he had a definite theory by which he
could proceed against the agents. It was suggested that T was attempting to
hold the agents upon their implied warranty of authority or upon the theory
that they had added their own responsibility. Thus, the case may be distin-
guished from Cross & Co. v. Matthews & Wallace supra.
M. Brennen & Sons v. Thompson (1915) 33 Ont. L. R. 465. 22 Dom. L.
R. 575, is in accord with the New Jersey decision except that the court was
even more strict. Therd T sued P and A together, got default judgment
against A, was granted a motion to vacate judgment and amend as to P. On
appeal, action was dismissed but judgment against A to remain.
1. Commonwealth v. Fortier (1927) 155 N. E. 8.
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A conviction is the legal result of a judgment of a court-
a matter always in writing. The proof of a conviction necessarily
means the proof of a formal written entry. On general principles
a witness could not be called to prove the existence and contents
of such a writing, without showing that it was unavailable. For
this reason a witness could not be disqualified by his admission
on voir dire examination that he had been convicted of a felony
or other infamous offense. It was necessary to produce the record.2
The same rule in most jurisdictions prevents the cross-examination
of a witness as to his prior conviction to discredit his testimony.'
Because a party cannot anticipate what witnesses will be called
and therefore cannot be prepared to produce the impeaching record,
the rule as to witnesses has been relaxed in some states,4 and
changed by statute in others.5 Where the statute or the prevailing
practice allows the cross-examination of a witness as to prior con-
victions to discredit, doubtless the same rule would' apply to a
defendant testifying on his own behalf, since he has voluntarily
assumed the same position as any other witness.6
Massachusetts, as already seen, excludes such a cross-examina-
tion of ordinary witnesses, and, treating the defendant as any other
witness, excludes cross-examination of him as to prior convictions
to discredit his testimony. 7  The reasons assigned for a different
rule, where the cross-examination as to pi-ior a conviction is for a
different purpose, are not very satisfactory.
When the defendant voluntarily took the stand and testified
on his own behalf, he waived his privilege of silence and his privilege
against self incrimination, and subjected himself to all legitimate
cross-examination. But it ha. never been thought before that he
also waived the benefit of the ordinary rules of evidence. For
example, he would not waive the benefit of the rule against forced
disclosure of confidential communications with his attorney., He
2. Rex v. Castell Careignion (1806) 8 East 77.
3. Commonwealth v. Quinn (1855) 5 Gray 478; Newcomb v. Griswold
(1862) 24 N. Y. 298; People v. Goodman (1918) 283 Ill. 414; Morris Joseloff
Co. v. Spirt (1922) 97 Conn. 447.
4. Clemens v. Conrad (1869) 19 Mich. 170.
5. Hurd's Rev. Sts. Ill. ch. 51 sec. 1: "That no person shall be disquali-
fied in any civil action. . . . but such interest or conviction may be shown
for the purpose of affecting the credibility of each witness; and the fact of
such conviction may be proved like any other fact not of record." The limi-
tation of this section to civil actions leaves the rule unchanged in criminal
prosecutions. People v. Goodman supra.
6. State v. Spivey (1905) 191 Mo. 87, 110. Where the statute expressly
authorizes such cross-examination of witnesses to discredit their testimony it
is quite natural that the statutory rule should be applied to a defendant assum-
ing the position of a witness, though the same reason does not apply, because
the prosecution could anticipate that the defendant would testify and be pre-
pared to produce the discrediting record.
Where the rule has been relaxed without statute the general tendency to
treat the defendant as any other witness would lead to a uniform rule.
7. Conoonwealth v. Walsh (1907) 196 Mass. 369. In this case, the
court was urged to make an exception against the defendant, but refused to
do so.
8. Hemmenway v. Smith (1856) 28 Vt. 701.
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would not waive the benefit of the best evidence rule requiring a
conviction to discredit him to be proved by the record. It would
not be contended that he would waive the rule against involuntary
confessions, so as to enable the prosecution to force him to admit
on cross-examination that he had confessed to escape threatened
violence by the police. The doctrine of waiver seems inadequate to
sustain the ruling.
The other reason assigned seems equally untenable. The fact
that a voluntary admission of the existence and contents of a writing
is received as an exception to the 'best evidence rule does not
lead to the conclusion that a party may therefore be compelled
to make an admission.
At a fairly early period an English case 10 approved the use
of a voluntary admission to prove the existence and contents of a
writing without accounting for its non-production, on the broad,
though rather unsatisfactory, ground that what a party chooses to
say against his own interest is presumably true and therefore ad-
missible.
A party may be as much mistaken about the contents of a
writing in general as an ordinary witness testifying from memory.
Every lawyer is familiar with the frequent discrepancy between his
client's statement of the contents of letters, contracts and the like,
and the documents themselves when later brought to his office
for his inspection. Casual admissions are frequently a very poor
substitute for the writings themselves. But in spite of quite serious
objections to reported admissions as substitutes for written in-
struments, many American courts, including those of Massachusetts,"
are too firmly committed to the English rule to reopen that vexed
question.
The English cases, however, lend no support to the inno-
vation that a party may be examined against his objection so as to
obtain admissions obviating the necessity of producing the original
writing. Under an English statute providing for the submission of
interrogatories to the adverse party, it has been held that his forced
answer as to the contents of a document was secondary evidence
and inadmissible until the original was accounted for.12 It has
also been held that the defendant could not cross-examine the
plaintiff as to the contents of a document not shown to be un-
available.13 In an ordinary civil case the Supreme Court of Mas-
sachusetts. took the same view, that a plaintiff, testifying on his
own behalf, could not be cross-examined as to the contents of a
written memorandum which he had not been notified to produce. 14
There is, however, a practical difference between a cross-
examination as to the contents of some documents and cross-ex-
amination as to the contents of a record alleged in the information.
9. Commnonwealth v. Walsh supra.
10. Slattery v. Pooley (1840) 6 M. & W. 664.
11. Smith v. Palmer (1850) 6 Cush. 513.
12. Sharpe v. Lamb (1840) 11 Ad. & E. 805.
13. Darby v. Ousley (1856) 1 H. & N. 1.
14. Smith v. Plant (1913) 216 Mass. 91, 104.
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In the latter case no actual prejudice is likely to result, because the
record is ordinarily accessible, and the pleading has notified the
defendant of its importance.
If -no conviction has taken place he will naturally deny it on
cross-examination. If there has been some sort of conviction in
fact, but legally defective, as for want of jurisdiction, or insuffi-
ciency of the charge to state the necessary offense, or from a failure
to enter the judgment as not infrequently happens on a plea of
guilty in an inferior court, the defendant is in a position to produce
the record itself and thus disclose the legal objection. In case of
documents of which the defendant has no notice or warning, and
which he may not be able to obtain in the midst of a trial, a cross-
examination may be manifestly unfair and prejudicial. He may
be forced to make general admissions as to the contents and effect
of documents when he is in no position to correct erroneous im-
pressions or raise legal objections by producing the instrument
itself.
If the rule is strictly confined to situations like that in the
principal case, there is no great practical objection. On the other
hand there is no positive reason for breaking in on the general rule,
because the prosecution ought to be prepared to produce the record
alleged in the information. And our law of evidence is complicated
enough without making unnecessary exceptions. If the exception
is not strictly confined it leads to all the objections which the best
evidence rule was designed to prevent.
E. W. HINTON.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-POWER OF STATE TO
REGULATE PRICE OF RESALE OF THEATRE TIcKETS By BRO-KERS.-
[United States] In Tyson & Bros.-United Theatre Ticket Offices,
Inc. v. Banton" the federal Supreme Court has just decided a question
of much interest to theatre-goers of our larger cities. A New York
statute2 required a license from those engaged in the business of
reselling theatre tickets, and criminally forbade a charge of more
than fifty cents a ticket by licensees for this service. It was ad-
mitted that this price afforded a reasonable return for the service.
Plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the business of reselling in New
York City yearly about 300,000 theatre tickets out of a total of
about 2,000,000 thus resold, sought an injunction in the local federal
district court against the enforcement of this law by the local state
district attorney. From a decree denying this, plaintiff appealed
and secured a reversal in his favor by a five to four decision of
the Supreme Court.
The opinion of the majority by Mr. justice Sutherland proceeds
chiefly upon the ground that the price at which theatres sell tickets
cannot be regulated for lack either of an historical sanction (such
as exists for inns, carriers, and grist mills) or of a sufficient public
necessity for it-if the price of food and of rents can be limited
1. (1927) 47 Sup. Ct. 426.
2. New York Laws 1922 ch. 590 secs. 167, 168. 172.
